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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH by and through I 
its ROAD COMMISSION, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
. Case No. 
vs. 10902 
STYLE-CRETE, INC., a Utah ) 
corpora ti on, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEf' 
NATURE OF CASE 
Separate eminent domain proceedings against two 
different portions of the defendant's property were con-
solidated and tried before a jury. 
DISPOSITION IN LU\VER COURT 
At the jury trial the only issue was the amount of 
compensation to be awarded defendant. On the jury's 
answer to special interrogatories the trial court entered 
1 
judgment against the Road Commission for $122,-
500.00, less a payment previously made, plus interest 
and costs. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff and appellant seeks reversal of the judg-
ment and remand of the case for a new trial. 
STATEMENT OF FACT 
Defendant owned a pre-cast concrete (or "pre-
cast stone") plant on a tract of 14.263 acres in Salt 
Lake City, lying east of the Surplus Canal, north of 
5th South street, and straddling what has become 23rd 
""Test street (R. 180, Ex. l). As shown in Appendix 
Figure l, the property was irregular in shape, with a 
narrow neck fronting on 5th South, and a somewhat 
wider corridor continuing north to a relatively large, 
square area. There was no access to the property other 
than from 5th South. 
On December 27, 1965, the Road Commission 
brought an action to condemn .417 acre of defendant's 
property for relocation of a railroad right of way, 
necessitated by highway construction in another area. 
This action involved a strip of land 100 feet wide, run-
ning east and west across the south end of the pan-
handle of defendant's tract. The strip is identified as 
"railroad" on the Appendix Figure 2. 
2 
On March 1, 1966, the Road Commission brought 
a second action to acquire approximately 1.2 acres for 
construction of a portion of a new thoroughfare to be 
known as 23rd \:Vest street. The property to be taken 
was a strip 80 feet in width running northerly and 
southerly, bisecting the large north area of defendant's 
property. In a preliminary non-jury trial the court 
found defendant to be the owner of an additional strip 
approximately 20 feet wide along the east side of the 
panhandle, which increased the 23rd \:Vest taking to 
1.582 acres (R. 182). These strips are identified on 
the Appendix Figure 2 as "23rd West street". The 
total property taken in both actions was 1.999 acres 
(R. 180, 182). 
Taking of the two strips, and construction of the 
railroad bed and 23rd West Street, divided defend-
ant's remaining property into three parts identified 
on Figure 2 as Parcels "A," "B," and "C". Parcel 
"A" contains .53 acres (R. 182) and now has frontage 
on both 5th South and 23rd \:Vest streets. Parcel "B'', 
upon which was located the building used by defendant 
for the manufacture of pre-cast concrete, contains 3.472 
acres (R. 183). Parcel "C," upon which defendant has 
constructed a new plant, lies east of 23rd \:Vest and 
contains 8.262 acres ( R. 183) . 
Prior to relocation the railroad right of way had 
been 800 or 900 feet to the north of defendant's building 
(R. 190). The northern edge of the relocated right 
of way is 9 to 10 feet, and the center line of the track 
3 
about 40 feet, from the southwest corner of defendant's 
building. The railroad track is 8 or 9 feet high ( R. 
194). The right of way is to be fenced (R. 201). 
The new 23rd West street, from a point level with 
5th South street, rises in elevation to cross the railroad, 
then descends to a height of about two feet near the 
northern part of defendant's tract ( R. 205-206). De-
fendant's access road having been taken, access to 
Parcels "B" and "C" could be had only from 23rd'¥ est, 
not a limited access highway (R. 209). 
There is no existing dispute as to the location and 
description of the property taken, or the character 
of the improvements constructed on the property. There 
is no substantial difference of opinion respecting the 
value of the parcels actually taken. But there is serious 
disagreement as to the amount of damages to the prop-
erty not condemned resulting from ( 1) its severance, 
and ( 2) construction of the improvements. 
Defendant claims that its property has been so 
damaged by the severance and construction that it is 
now worth less than 1/3 of its former value. Testimony 
was presented to the effect that defendant's solidly 
constructed 17,000 square foot concrete building will 
no longer be useable for the manufacture of pre-cast 
concrete or anything else-indeed, will be suitable only 
for "dead storage" (R. 671). The primary factors re-
quiring an almost total abandonment of the building 
were claimed by defendant to be ( 1) vibrations from 




of severance of Parcels "A" and "C" from the plant 
site, Parcel "B," depriving the plant of needed storage 
space for curing concrete products ( R. 280) . 
There were confiicts in the evidence relating to the 
effect of railroad vibrations upon the concrete manu-
facturing operation. 
The trainmaster for Western Pacific Railroad 
Company testified that 12 trains per day, averaging 
80 to 100 cars and weighing approximately 5,000 tons 
per train, could be expected to pass the defendant's 
plant in a given 24 hour period ( R. 225-226) ; the speed 
would vary, but the trains would be either accelerating 
or decelerating in that area ( R. 229, 232). The train 
schedule showed, however, that most trains would pass 
the defendant's plant during periods in which it was 
not in operation (Ex. D-12). 
David J. Leeds, an engineering seismologist, who 
had measured vertical vibrations emanating from other 
railroad tracks in the vicinity (R. 283), found that the 
vibrations measured 1/10,000 of an inch, and were 
repeated seven times per second during the period in 
which a train was passing (R. 307). In his opinion 
the vibrail,ion was unacceptable, in part because it 
"would upset the people" in the plant ( R. 323) , though 
admittedly the amount of upset would depend on how 
long-continued the vibration was and the type of opera-
tion being carried on in the plant (R. 323). Mr. Leeds 
expressed the opinion that setting concrete would be 
damaged by the vibrations (R. 319), "that incipient 
5 
hidden damage might be sustained" (R. 319). Mr. 
Leeds' knowledge of the properties of setting concrete 
was based in part upon information obtained from the 
Portland Cement Association (R. 329), but he had not 
read any P.C.A. publications relating to the effects 
of jarring on fresh concrete (R. 329). 
Mr. McCown Edward Hunt, a consulting civil 
engineer and partner in an architectural engineering 
firm, stated that setting concrete would probably be 
affected by vibrations (R. 444), but Mr. Hunt was 
talking of vibrations of approximately I/16th inch, 
not 1/10,000 as measured by Mr. Leeds (R. 447). 
Mr. ';y esley Riddle Budd, an architect, testified 
that concrete in the setting stage would be damaged 
by vibrations, and on the assumption that railroad vibra-
tions would damage the concrete products, his recom-
mendation would be that the plant not be used for the 
manufacture of pre-cast concrete. His opinions on the 
effect of vibrations were based in part on information 
obtained from the Portland Cement Association (R. 
493). 
Evidence respecting the critical character of set-
ting concrete and the likely effect of railroad vibrations 
was rebutted by witnesses called by the Road Com-
mission. Mr. Oswald C. 'iVilde, engineer and estimator 
for Otto Buehner Company, testified that the Buehner 
plant located on 'iVilmington A venue in Salt Lake 
City was within 25 to 30 feet of railroad tracks, close 
enough for vibrations to be felt when trains passed. 
6 
Nevertheless, no precautions were taken at that plant 
to protect pre-cast concrete from vibration while set-
ting, and he knew of no deleterious effects upon the 
products manufactured at the plant (R. 850). 
Mr. Wilde described operations in a new Buehner 
plant in Murray, Utah, including the use of a "Shok 
Beton," installed in place of traditional vibrators. A 
Shok Beton is a large steel table, weighing from 15 to 
30 tons (including its load), which is raised Vi inch 
above a solid concrete floor and dropped two hundred 
fifty times a minute ( R. 852). The resulting vibrations 
can be felt without an instrument as far as 150 feet 
away (R. 854), but setting concrete is placed as close 
as 12 feet from the Shok Beton while in operation. It 
is the practice of the company to run the Shok Beton 
from a few to 30 or 40 minutes at a time, but during 
its operation no precautions are taken to prevent vibra-
tion-caused damage to other concrete previously left 
to set or cure. 
Mr. Chris Pickett, district structural engineer for 
the Portland Cement Association, which performs tech-
nical services and studies in connection with uses and 
characteristics of cement and concrete ( R. 859) , tes-
tified that vibrations of the amplitude measured by 
Leeds, or other vibrations which might be expected 
from passing trains, would have no significant effect 
upon setting concrete (R. 865). A publication of the 
Portland Cement Association (Ex. 15) shows that ran-
dom vibrations haYe not been found to be injurious to 
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setting concrete and in most instances have increased 
its strength. 
Defendant's evidence as to damage resulting from 
the reduction in size of Parcel "B" because of its sever-
ance from Parcels "A" and "C", was more convincing; 
and, because of the court's rulings on evidence, largely 
unchallenged. 
Delbert A. Peterson, defendant's president, testi-
fied that shop space, ample storage space, and parking 
space are needed for efficient operation of a pre-cast 
concrete plant (R. 263); and that construction of the 
railroad and 23rd West deprived defendant of space 
needed to store concrete products during the curing 
period (R. 265). He said that one of the major factors 
of damage to the concrete plant operation was that 
Parcel "C" ( 8.262 acres), separated from the plant by 
23rd West, could not be used for such storage ( R. 280). 
Mr. Hunt confirmed the need for large outside 
storage areas in the manufacture of pre-cast stone, 
pointing out that storage must be available for various 
purposes ( R. 439) . The reduction in the size of the 
storage area adversely affects the flexibility of the plant, 
according to Mr. Hunt (R. 456). Mr. Budd agreed 
that plant expansion would be prevented (R. 497). 
Ray Williams, defendant's appraiser, who concluded 
that defendant's Parcel "B" would be marketable only 
for dead storage, based his opinion in part upon the 
severance. He testified at great length as to the impor-
8 
tance of a large area in the vicinity of the plant, not 
only for the manufacture of pre-cast concrete, but for 
necessary growth of any other potential industry (R. 
687-688). C. Francis Solomon, an appraiser called 
by plaintiff, in concluding that the highest and best 
use of plaintiff's plant was no longer for manufacture 
of pre-cast concrete, had been impressed by the lack of 
storage area, and its effects as related to him by de-
defendant's officers (R. 762-765, 831). 
Notwithstanding the importance of size as an 
element of damage to the defendant's property, plaintiff 
was precluded from presenting evidence that comparable 
property was available as a substitute for the severed 
parcels. 
After Mr. Peterson had told the jury of the need 
for a large storage area, he was asked on cross exami-
nation whether he had inquired into availability of 
property to replace that no longer available for storage. 
Objection was made, but the court adjourned. before 
ruling. On recall Mr. Peterson testified that he had 
made an investigation of the availability of property 
before condemnation and knew that property was 
owned nearby by Mr. Arnold (R. 346). 
Mr. Hunt, who had testified as to the need of large 
outside storage areas (R. 439), was asked on cross ex-
amination concerning the possibility of substituting 
land on the west, but an objection was sustained on the 
ground that there had been no showing of availability 
of other property (R. 457), notwithstanding Mr. Peter-
9 
son's earlier testimony that he knew of the Arnold 
property. 
When plaintiff called Mr. R. L. Arnold, president 
of Arnold .Machinery Company (R. 736), objection 
was made to the testimony, before any questions had 
been asked. The court indicated that evidence respect-
ing the availability of other property was not material, 
whereupon plaintiff made an offer of proof substan-
tially as follows: 
That Arnold Machinery Company, of which 
he is the president, owns a parcel of approxi-
mately 10 acres of real property lying between 
defendant's Parcel "B" and the right of way of 
the Surplus Canal; that there are no distinguish-
ing land marks separating the defendant's prop-
erty from the Arnold l\iachinery Company 
property; that the property, except for a small 
portion lying north of Style-Crete property 
along thet old 'Vestern Pacific right of way, 
has been owned by Arnold Machinery Company 
for approximately 25 years; that as of December 
28, 1965, [the date of condemnation) the prop-
erty was available for purchase by a purchaser 
who was ready, willing and able to pay a reason-
able purchase price therefor; that it was ulti-
mately sold by Arnold lVIachinery Company in 
May, 1966, for $3,000.00 per acre; and that the 
question of purchasing the property had been 
raised with officers of the defendant prior to its 
sale (R. 934). 
[Figure 3, Appendix, shows the location of the 
Arnold Machinery Company property relative to de-
fendant's property, the surplus canal, and other land· 
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marks. Plaintiff's Exhibit 28, an ownership plat, shows 
the location of the Arnold property, but the court 
refused to admit it.} 
Half of plaintiff's case having been annihiliated 
by the court's rejection of evidence that comparable 
property was available, the testimony of two appraisers 
was anti-climactic and of questionable value on the 
damages actually suffered by defendant. 
Although somewhat different methods of compu-
tation were used, there was not much difference of 
opinion as to the total value of the property before 
condemnation. Mr. Williams' figure was $183,112.96 
(R. 594) and Mr. Solomon's $184,700.00 (R. 726). 
Mr. Williams believed the raw land itself would 
be damaged by the taking and construction, largely 
because of the need to fill to near street level. This 
and his belief that the building could no longer be 
used for anything other than dead storage led him 
to conclude that the value of the land after the con-
demnation would be $32,532.00 and the building 
$28,036.36, or a total of $60,568.36 ( R. 622), estab-
lishing $122,526.60 as the amount necessary to com-
pensate defendant for taking and damage. 
l\1r. Solomon was of the opinion that defendant's 
building would be suitable for a number of types of 
industry (R. 730) ; that the land would be worth $44,-
450.00 after condemnation; and that the improvements 
would be worth $68,750.00-for a total "after" value 
11 
of $II3,200.00 ( R. 7 41) . The amount needed to com-
pensate defendant for taking and damage would thus 
be $71,500.00. 
[There was some evidence to the effect that the 
defendant could no longer use a septic tank on its 
property and would be forced to incur astronomical 
costs for acquisition and maintenance of a "sealed 
vault" for sewage disposal ( R. 514-517). The evidence, 
however, was of doubtful weight; and the argument 
to follow will point out why it, and evidence relating 
to parking spaces and plant re-arrangement (R. 263-
272 ) are of minor significance with respect to the issues 
raised in this appeal.} 
ARGUMENT 
THE COURT ERRONEOUSLY EXCLUD· 
ED EVIDENCE RELATING TO THE AVAIL-
ABILITY OF PROPERTY COMPARABLE 
TO THAT SEVERED FROM DEFENDANT'S 
PRE-CAST STONE PLANT. 
Under the provisions of 78-34-10 Utah Code An-
notated 1953, the jury in an eminent domain case is 
required to determine the value of the property con-
demned, and 
"If the property * * * constitutes only a part 
of a larger parcel, the damages which will accrue 
to the portion not sought to be condemned by 
reason of its severance from the portion sought 
12 
to be condemned and the construction of the 
improvement in the manner proposed by the 
plaintiff." 
By its rulings on the evidence in this case the trial 
court has disregarded the fact that "damages" not 
"market value" are in issue, and has held, in substance, 
that a condemnee has no obligation to mitigate those 
damages. Moreover, the ruling appears to have been 
made square in the teeth of cases decided by this court. 
In the Provo River Water Users v. Carlson, 103 
Utah 73, 133 P .2d 777 ( 1943), plaintiff had condemned 
18.75 acres of defendant's pasture land for construction 
of a reservoir. The property owner sought severance 
damages on the theory that the taking of his pasture 
land damaged other property being used as a dairy 
farm. The trial court awarded severance damages but 
was reversed on appeal. This court said: 
" * * * this uncultivated pasture land was not 
shown to be the only pasture land available with-
in a mile and a half of the Carlson barns. * * * 
"If other pasture lands approximately the 
same distance from the Carlson barns could be 
purchased, which would place Carlson in rela-
tively the same position he was in before the 
18.75 acre tract was condemned, he would be 
damaged only to the extent of the cost of acquir-
ing such other pasture. The purchase price of 
such other pasture woulrl substantially deter-
mine the market value of the 18.75 acres." 
The court then pointed out that even if unculti-
vated pasture land was not available, defendant would 
13 
not be entitled to severance damage if other farm lands 
were available which would produce relatively the same 
results, and continued: 
"If [defendant} could purchase other pasture 
land or farm land convertible into pasture, with-
in a distance from his barns comparable to that 
of the condemned tract, and such other land 
would provide relatively the same kind of forage 
for the same number of cows or forage of equal 
ration-value throughout the seven months he 
used the wild pasture tract, it could not be con-
tended that his properties in Charleston could be 
impaired or depreciated by taking the pasture. 
If another tract of equal foreage-producing 
value and conveniences could be substituted for 
the tract condemned, whether larger or smaller 
in area, the defendant would be in relatively · 
the same position he was in before the construc-
tion of the reservoir." 
In State v. Cooperative Security Corporation of 
the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, 122 
Utah 134, 247 P.2d 269, (1952), a highway condem-
nation case, plaintiff took 7.89 acres of pasture land, 
part of a 131-acre dairy farm. The new highway bi-
sected the farm, leaving two small tracts separated from 
the main one. The trial court fixed $2,564.00 as the 
value of the land taken, and $10,919.00 as severance 
damage to the property not taken. On appeal, this 
court noted the award must have been based on the 
theory that the fair market value of the remammg 
property, including the two small tracts, had been 
depreciated by the $10,919.00, and said: 
14 
"Even if it were conceded that the land taken 
was part of the unit operation * * * and that 
under the provisions of Sec. 104-61-11, (2), 
U.C.A. 1943, respondents were entitled to sever-
ance damages for the portion not taken, the 
question still remains whether under the facts 
of this case severance damages to the extent 
granted were proved. 
The compensation to which an owner is en-
titled for severance damages in condemnation 
proceedings is the difference in fair market value 
of his property before and after the taking. State 
v. 'i\T ard, 112 Utah 452, 189 P.2d 113. Where 
severance damage is sought to a remaining tract 
on the theory that the taking has depreciated the 
fair market value of that tract there must be 
proof that no comparable land is available in 
the area of the condemned land. 
* * * In the instant case there was evidence 
that at the time the summons was served and 
possession of the land sought to be condemned 
was taken by the State there was available a 
tract of pasture land adjacent to respondent's 
property on the east and only separated from 
it by a fence. This tract was comparable to the 
land taken for the use to which it had been put. 
It contained 15.3 acres and it was admitted 
* * * that at least a part of it was available and 
had been offered for sale but respondents had 
refused to buy it." [Emphasis added. J 
The court then went on to note that whether or 
not the land was still available was not determinative, 
inasmuch as damages accrue at the date of the service 
of summons. 
15 
The above cases should be controlling here unless 
a pre-cast concrete plant in eminent domain proceedings 
is sui generis, the principle having been applied to farm 
and factory alike. 
A decision relied upon in the Provo River Water 
Users case, City of St. Louis v. St. Louis I.M. & S.R. 
Co., 272 Mo. 80, 197 S.W. 107 (1917), involved a 
manufacturing plant used for the production of white 
lead. The plant consisted of two parcels divided by a 
street, the south parcel being used as a "corroding 
yard" upon which 48% of the lead production had been 
corroded. The balance had been corroded on the north 
parcel. The plaintiff condemned 17 ,800 of the 22,872 
square feet on the south parcel, which rendered it use-
less as a corroding yard. 
The condemnee contended that the taking from 
the south corroding yard destroyed 48% of the cor-
roding area, practically resulting in destruction of the 
white lead plant. The condemnor on the other hand, 
contended that the value of the plant was not depreci-
ated because other parcels of land could have been pro-
cured by defendant to take the place of the south 
corroding yard. The trial court found that immediately 
west of and contiguous to the north parcel there was 
for sale 21,000 square feet of land for about $51,000, 
which was as available for use in connection with the 
part remaining as the part appropriated; that defend-
ant could continue to use the north parcel for lead 
manufacturing to just as good advantage and as eco-
16 
nomically as before the appropriation by rearranging 
it in connection with the 21,000 square feet; that it 
would be as valuable as it was before the appropriation; 
and, therefore, that the compensation allowed would 
be the market value of the 17,800 square feet taken, 
the depreciation in the market value of the 5,072 feet 
south of the part taken, the cost of rearrangement, and 
the depreciation in value of the 60,000 square feet in 
the north parcel in its rearranged condition. On appeal 
the Supreme Court of Missouri affirmed, stating: 
"It is conceded, of course, that damages for 
land taken through the exercise of the power 
of eminent domain may not be paid in anything 
but money; that neither other parcels of land 
nor the sale thereof are current media of pay-
ment therefor, and that the owner of land may 
not be compelled to swap lands nor to move into 
another town, or city, or state where the land is 
cheap and have such cheapness compared as a 
criterion of value against the lands taken. But 
when land is devoted to a special use and it is 
urged that such use has been wholly or partially 
destroyed by the taking of a parcel of such land, 
it will be appreciated that some complete cri-
terion by which to measure the quantum of 
damage sustained is absolutely necessary; other-
wise the amount of depreciation would be a 
mere matter of bald guessing. 
" * * * The rule [adopted by the trial court J, 
of course, should be limited to cases wherein 
only part of a tract devoted to a special use is 
appropriated. It can have no relevancy to a case 
wherein the whole of a parcel is taken. For, we 
repeat, in no case can the owner, for the con-
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venience of the condemnor, be required to swap 
lands, or go into the market and buy other lands 
in lieu of those taken. But in a case where the 
taking of a part of a tract which is devoted to 
a special use results in a large depreciation in 
value for that special use, the measure of that 
depreciation ought to be the sum required to 
be extended in order to rehabilitate the property 
for such use, or replace the plant in statu quo 
ante capiendum; provided, of course, that re-
habilitation in such matter be practicable. * * * 
In cases where no available property is owned 
by him whose land is taken, the price at which 
other lands adjacent, equally as valuable intrin-
sically, as convenient, as economical in use, and 
as accessible, and which can be bought, may be 
shown as measuring the amount of depreciation 
to which the lands damaged but not physically 
taken have been subjected. 
"A situation wherein any other view is un-
thinkable is possible. For if the appellant's lead 
factory had been worth a million dollars and the 
parcel actually taken had been itself of little 
value and it contained an accessory of small 
intrinsic worth, but one without which the mil-
lion dollar plant would have been rendered 
useless, the principle would be exactly the same. 
But even if appellant in the supposed case itself 
possessed no other land, would it be contended 
that the city could be saddled with the entire 
value of the plant as damages, when other lands 
in every way as available could be bought to 
reduce the damages? We think not, and con-
clude that, insofar as the learned trial court 
considered the price at which other lands, equal-
ly as available and useable by appellant could 
have been obtained, as the measure of damages 
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of the depreciation in rnlue of the whole plant 
by reason of the taking of the corroding yard, 
he was right * * * " [Emphasis added.} 
In ~Hannibal Bridye Co. v. Slwuuacher, 57 lVIo. 582 
( 1847), the defendant's brewery occupied two lots 
separated by a street. A lot containing a portion of the 
bre,rery equipment, connected to the other part by 
pipes, was condemned. \Vithout the equipment the 
brewery could not be operated successfully. The de-
fendant contended that the taking of the one lot 
destroyed the brewery and that it was damaged to the 
brewery's full value. Although land was available on 
the other side of the street on which the equipment 
could be located so that the brewery could be success-
fully operated, the trial court refused to hear any 
testimony on the cost of removing the equipment to the 
other side of the street. The Missouri court reversed, 
holding: 
"If [the equipment} could have been trans-
ferred to the western side of the alley and placed 
in such a situation that the brewery could have 
been just as effectively operated as it was before, 
then the actual loss to defendants would have 
been the trouble and expense of making the re-
moval. 
"This, then we are inclined to think would 
be the proper and appropriate measure of dam-
ages, yiz;., the cost and expense of removing 
the malt house, horsepower, pump and pipe to 
the west side of the alley so it could be used as 
effectively and adrnntageously for running the 
brewery as it was run before. * '1:· * " 
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In Illinois & St. L. R. Co. v. Switzer, 117 Ill. 399, 
7 N .E. 664 ( 1886), the railroad condemned a right of 
way across land upon which defendant operated a mill. 
The railroad would have severed the main portion 
of defendant's mill from lands containing its water 
supply. When the railroad offered to prove that there 
was other water which would be available to defendant 
and serve its purposes just as well, the trial court re-
fused the offer, but the Illinois Supreme Court reversed, 
stating: 
"There was, in this, manifest error, for which 
the judgment must be reversed. There having 
been an estimate of damages made on the bases 
that the pond would be destroyed as a source 
of supply of water for the mill and that there 
would be no other means of such supply, it 
obviously should have been permitted to show 
that there would be other sources of supply not, 
as is supposed by appellee's counsel, for the pur-
pose of showing that there would be no damage, 
but for the purpose of affecting the amount of 
damage; the amount of the estimate of damages 
by appellee's witnesses having based on the sup-
position that there would be no other means of 
supplying the mill with water." 
In City of St. Louis v. Paramount Shoe Mfg. Co., 
168 S.W. 2nd 149 (Mo. Ct. of Appeals, 1943), the 
plaintiff had condemned a portion of defendant's land 
upon which it proposed to expand its shoe manufactur-
ing plant sometime in the future, plans for the expan-
sion having been in existence. The defendant main-
tained that the city, by cutting off a small portion of 
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the land upon which expansion was contemplated, had 
substantially damaged the balance of the plant. As 
noted by the court: 
"Such consequential damage allegedly result-
ing from the limitation put upon the plant's 
future expansion was the chief factor taken into 
consideration by respondent's witnesses in con-
nection with damages occasioned by the taking." 
The value of the land actually taken was only a 
small portion of the damages claimed. The city had 
contended that evidence regarding the cost of available 
land in the area should not have been admitted. The 
appellate court rejected this contention, stating: 
"It was competent for respondent to show, 
not only the cost of any adjacent land upon 
which a future additional building might be 
erected but also the infeasibility of operating its 
plant under the conditions which the erection of 
the new building at that location would impose. 
All this was relevant to the issue in the case for 
if additional land could be acquired upon which 
respondent's enlarged plant could be completed 
and operated as satisfactorily as would have been 
the case upon the land originally bought for that 
purpose, then obviously there would have been 
no injury done to respondent's property through 
hinderance to expansion and its total damages 
could hardly have exceeded the value of the land 
actually taken by the appropriation. 
"It has been said that in the case where 
land is taken by condemnation, the price at which 
he may buy equally valuable, convenient and 
accessible land may be shown by the owner as 
21 
measuring the amount of <lepreciation to whic.:h 
the lau<l damaged but not physically taken has 
been subjected * * '-* in this case it was un<loubt-
edly respondent's duty, when injured by the 
appropriation of part of its land, to minimize 
the damages to the remairnler if it could." 
In Gulf C. & S.Jl'. Ry. Co. v. Brnyger, 24 Tex. Civ. 
367, 59 S.,V. 556 (1900), the railroad had condemned 
a portion of defendant's timber lands. The defendant 
maintained that without these timber lands the value 
of the remainder of his farm was seriously depreciated. 
The plaintiff argued that there were other timber lands 
in the area which were available to the defendant. The 
court stated: 
"It is clear to us that the proximity and the 
price of adjacent or contiguous timber land of 
a similar character was a fact proper to be con-
sidered by the jury in determining the extent 
to which appellee's lands would be depreciated 
by the loss of this particular tract." 
The court pointed out that this was not for the 
purpose of showing separate items of damages but a 
matter to be considered in determining to what extent 
the value of his land would be affected by the con-
demnation. The court held the testimony not to be 
proper in that case, however, because it was not shown 
when the lands were available. See also Union Electric 
Light & Power Co. v. Snider Estate Co., 65 F.2d 297 
(8th Cir., 1933). 
Section 78-34-10, U.C.A., 1953, and the cases 
construing it, e.g., State v. IV ard, 112 Utah 452, 189 
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P.2d 113 (1948); State v. Fourth Judicial Court, 94 
Utah 384, 78 P.2d 502, (1937), make it plain that there 
is a substantial distinction between compensation for 
land taken, and damages to property not taken. For 
property taken, the measure of just compensation is the 
market value of land taken; but for property not taken, 
an owner is entitled only to an amount representing 
the damage actually done to the land. It is an elemen-
tary principle of the law of damages that any per~on 
damaged is required, where possible, to minimize or 
mitigate his loss. If property were damaged by someone 
lacking the power of eminent domain, the mitigation 
rule would apply. It is difficult to conceive a rational 
basis for relieving a land owner of the duty to mitigate 
solely because his property is damaged by a legitimized 
public use. 
In the present case attempts to examine defend-
ant's witnesses about the availability of land adjacent 
to that being condemned and the feasibility of utilizing 
that tract were thwarted by the court's rulings on the 
defendant's objections. The Road Commission's offer 
to prove the availability of comparable property was 
refused. And the court failed to give any instruction 
on the availability of other property. 
The offer to proof, made after the objection to 
testimony of R. L. Arnold, shows that there was land 
adjacent to respondent's plant which would have from 
all appearances, served to replace Parcel "C". The land 
was available for sale on the date the summons was 
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served and was ultimately sold for $3,000.00 an acre-
substantially less than <lefendauf s land was claimed to 
be worth. 
The value of the land actually taken in this case 
was very small (approximately $10,000) compared to 
the total amount a warded by the j nry ( $122 ,500) . 
Although not presented by the defendant in that way, 
simple mathematics shows that of the total award, 
$112,500 was for severance damage to defendant's re-
maining land. 
The court's rejection of evidence of the availability 
of comparable property was error, and it can hardly 
be gainsaid that the error was prejudicial, in light of 
the theory on which the case was tried. 
The exceedingly high severance and proximity 
damages claimed by the defendant in this case were 
based upon the following factors: 
( 1) Vibrations emanating from the relocated track 
of the Western Pacific Railroad would be expected 
to damage setting concrete, thus prohibiting further 
use of defendant's plant for pre-cast concrete products. 
(2) The manufacture of pre-cast concrete required 
a relatively large outside area in which to store the 
concrete products while they cure. Prior to condemna-
tion such an area was available in Parcel "C," but after 
condemnation, because of the grade of 23rd 'Vest, it 
was not, and defendant's plant therefore could no longer 
be used for the manufacture of pre-cast concrete. 
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( 3) All industrial plants need an area for con-
templated future expansion. By severing Parcel "C" 
from Parcel "B'', the area surrounding the defendant's 
pre-cast concrete plant was too small, and a reasonably 
prudent man would not purchase Parcel "B" for any 
manufacturing operation. It must therefore be used 
for dead storage, a most uneconomical use. 
( 4) By severing Parcel "A" from Parcel "B" and 
taking the 20-foot way along the east side of Parcel 
"B", the parking area was eliminated and the unloading 
areas were reduced to such a size that operations of 
the plant for the manufacture of pre-cast concrete 
would be adversely affected. 
( 5) The railroad with its nine-foot fill would inter-
fere with the esthetic enjoyment of those working in 
or visiting the plant. 
( 6) The pressure of the railroad embankment has 
so changed the character of the underlying ground that 
the water table has been raised, it will no longer be 
possible to have a septic tank on the premises, and the 
defendant will be required to use an inordinately ex-
pensive sealed vault for sewage disposal. A septic tank 
cannot be installed with drain fields running in a differ-
ent direction largely b ecause of the reduced size of 
Parcel "B". A reasonably prudent person, therefore, 
would not purchase the property for manufacturing, 
and the person is useful only for dead storage. 
The height of and vibration emanating from the 
railroad are the only factors unrelated to the size of 
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Parcel "B". A witness with long experience in the 
manufacture of pre-cast concrete testified to the effect 
that random vibrations have never been a problem; a 
Portland Cement Association expert testified that vibra-
tions of an amplitude much greater than those found 
by Mr. Leeds would not affect adversely setting con-
crete; and a publication of the Portland Cement Asso-
ciation indicates that random vibrations not only do 
not damage setting concrete but in many instances 
strengthen it. For industry, esthetics is minor. 
The evidence relating to the ability of the defend-
ant to locate a septic tank upon its premises was specu-
lative. Mr. Caldwell, of the Salt Lake City health 
department, testified that the necessary steps to obtain 
approval of location of a septic tank, including the 
furnishing of information about test holes and the 
character of the underlying ground, had never been 
submitted to the City by the defendant. 
The defendant did not offer any substantial evi-
dence that the interference with the parking areas and 
the unloading areas would prevent the continued opera-
tion of defendant's plant for the manufacture of pre-
cast concrete. 
There was evidence that the size of Parcel "B" and 
the need for curing, as well as the need for room to 
expand in the case of other industrial operations, was 
critical, and the jury must have been left with the 
impression that even if the plant coul<l continue opera-
tions despite railroad vibrations, septic tank problems 
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and reduced parking and unloading areas, the reduction 
in size of Parcel "B" was so serious that the plant could 
no longer be used for any purpose other than a "dead 
storage" warehouse. 
The court would not permit plaintiff to show that 
the plant could have been "salvaged" and the damages 
greatly reduced if the defendant had only desired to 
do so, and if the jury believed defendant's evidence 
respecting the size of Parcel "B", it had little choice 
but to do what it did, even if it rejected all other fac-
tors. On its face the error was prejudicial and a new 
trial should be granted. 
II 
THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING THE 
PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTION 
NO. 15, AND IN FAILING TO GIVE ANY IN-
STRUCTION RELATING TO THE EFFECT 
OF AVAILABILITY OF COMPARABLE 
PROPERTIES ON SEVERANCE DAMAGES 
RECOVERABLE BY THE DEFENDANT. 
The Provo River Water Users and Co-Operative 
Security Corportaion cases, cited supra under Point I, 
went further than merely holding that evidence of 
the availability of comparable property is relevant and 
material on the issue of severance damages. Both of 
the cases are authority for the proposition that the 
condemnee has the burden of proving unavailability 
of replacement land. 
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In the Co-Operative Security Corporation case 
the court said : 
"Where severance damage is sought to a re-
maining tract on the theory that the taking has 
depreciated the fair market value of that tract 
there must be proof that no comparable land is 
available in the area of the condemned land." 
(Emphasis added.) 
Although the court had effectively precluded the 
plaintiff in this case from showing that other land was 
available, plaintiff asked the court for an opportunity 
to ie-c tne Jlil'Y consider the question of the lack of proof 
of unavailability of comparable property, much of the 
opinion evidence in the case having been based upon 
the assumption that the diminshed size prohibited any 
economical use of Parcel "B". Plaintiff's requested 
Instruction No. 15 (R. 80) was directed at this point. 
The requested instruction was as follows: 
"Damages sought by defendant in this case 
include 'severance damages,' that is, damages 
resulting to the defendant's remaining property 
because of the separation of portions of the prop-
erty of the property by 23rd 'Vest street on the 
one hand and the railroad right of way on the 
other. 
"In order for the defendant to recover such 
severance damages it has the burden of proving, 
by a preponderance of the evidence, that as of 
December 28, 1965, the date of service of the 
summons, no comparable land was available to 
it in the area which could be substituted for the 
land taken or severed. If such comparable land 
28 
was available to the defendant, proximity and 
severance damages should total an amount rep-
resenting the difference between ( 1) the value 
of the remainder before the taking and ( 2) the 
value of the remainder plus the comparable land 
after the taking less the cost of the comparable 
land." 
The requested instruction substantially incorporates 
the reasoning of the court in the Provo River Water 
Users and Co-operative Security Corporation cases. 
By refusing to permit the plaintiff to introduce evidence 
respecting availability of additional property, and 
refusing to give the requested Instruction 15, or any 
instruction relating to the effect of comparable land 
upon severance damages, the court placed the jury in 
a position in which it had little choice but to accept 
the opinion of one appraiser or another, whereas the 
jury should have been free to consider the validity of 
the assumptions made by both appraisers in arriving 
at their opinions of "after" value. 
Possibly requested Instruction 15 is not a model 
instruction, but even so, the court had some duty to 
place before the jury the "availability" question. It is 
a matter that bears not only upon the direct claims of 
the parties but the credibility of the various witnesses 
who saw nothing but chaos in defendant's future. 
Some instruction on this should have been given; 
and if, for some reason, this court finds the requested 
instruction was properly refused, it should exercise the 
discretion provided for in Rule 51, U.R.C.P., and 
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review the failure to give any instruction on availability 
of comparable property. 
III 
THE COURT MISDIRECTED THE JURY 
ON THE LA ''V AND COMMENTED ON THE 
EVIDENCE. 
Not only did the court confine plaintiff to trial of 
half a case, but with respect to that half it misdirected 
the jury and commented on the evidence in such a 
manner that the jury must have understood that it 
would be pleasing the court if it gave full credence to 
defendant's evidence and returned a verdict for as much 
as the defendant was asking. A number of the instruc-
tions given by the court (at defendant's request) were 
erroneous, and the cumulative effect was to deprive 
the plaintiff of a fair trial by an objective jury un-
influenced by the court's expression of its views. 
Instruction No. 4 (R. 19) which invokes Article 1, 
Section 22 of the Utah Constitution, and the Fifth 
Amendment of the United States Constitution, might 
be proper in a civics class, but it directs the jury's 
attention away from the issues being tried, i.e., the 
amount of compensation and damages to be awarded 
for the taking of defendant's property and construction 
of the improvement, pursuant to Title 78, Chapter 3.Ji, 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, and decisions thereunder. 
It is incorrect to state that a person whose property 
is condemned for public use is to be made "no worse 
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economically," than if his property had not been con-
demned. Frequently great economic losses result to 
condemnees because of the need to abandon or relocate 
an established business; yet the compensation awarded 
must come from within specific statutory and courl 
rules. See, e.g., State v. Ward, 112 Utah 452, 189 P.2d 
113 ( 1948); State v. Rozelle, 101 Utah 464, 120 P.2d 
276 (1941); Springville Banking Co. v. Burton, 10 
Utah 2d 100, 349 P.2d 157 (1960); State v. Bettilyons, 
Inc., 17 Utah 2d 135, 405 P.2d 420 (1965). Instruction 
No. 4, in effect, suggests to the jury that it may con-
sider factors, not wholly expressed in dollars, which 
might injure defendant in its future operations or 
interfere with its plans for expansion and increased 
profits. Moreover, the instruction erroneously states 
the damages for severance as the "loss of value" in the 
defendant's remaining property. This is particularly 
so in light of the court's refusal to give plaintiff's re-
quested Instruction No. 15 and its refusal to hear any 
evidence respecting the availability of property which 
would have permitted the defendant to mitigate its 
damages. The jury was left only with an expert's 
opinion as to the dimunition in the value of the property 
without the opportunity to consider other factors which 
might permit continued use of the concrete plant. 
Instruction No. 8 (R. 23) unduly emphasizes the 
defendant's evidence with respect to the damages it 
suffered. The instruction is simply a catalogue of each 
item of evidence relied upon by the defendant's ap-
praiser and would be expected to impress the jury as 
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a comment by the court that this evidence was of greater 
importance than other evidence in the case relating to 
damage. As stated in 88 C.J .S. Trial, §340: 
"Since instructions should not draw the atten-
tion of the jury to particular facts, it is error to 
give instructions and under other circumstances 
it is proper to ref use to give instructions which 
unduly emphasize issues, theories, defenses, par-
ticular evidence, specific or assumed facts, or 
burden of proof, whether by singling them out 
and making them unduly prominent * * *" 
citing, among other cases, Mecham v. Allen, 1 Utah 2d 
79, 262 p .2d 285 ( 1953). 
We have been unable to find any support in the 
cases for the proposition embraced by Instruction No. 
10 ( R. 25), i.e., that notwithstanding severance of the 
property into three more-or-less separate parcels the 
jury was to consider the value of the remaining prop-
erty as if it were still one parcel. It was undisputed 
in the evidence that the three parcels were separated 
by construction of the railroad right of way and 23rd 
West street. The testimony of both appraisers, ref erred 
to the property as three separate parcels, and there was 
no evidence in the record respecting the market value 
of the property as a single piece. Not only did the 
instruction ignore defendant's obligation to mitigate 
its damages, but invited the jury to speculate whether 
defendant's damage might exceed even the damages 
fixed by appraisers, who testified as to the values of 
each of three separate parcels of property, it being 
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common knowledge that marketing three parcels as 
one would be more difficult. In State v. Tedesco, 4 
Utah 2d 248, 291 P.2d 1028 (1956), this court held 
that property taken by condemnation must go to the 
condemnor for its fair market value for the total price 
and not for an amount based on an aggragate of values 
of individual lots in a subdivis1on, which the condemnee 
hoped to sell individually. This, however, was for land 
taken, not that remaining, and is the reverse of the 
situation dealt with in defendant's instruction. It was 
noted in Tedesco that "a condemnee is not entitled to 
realize a profit on his property," but a profit could very 
well be realized under defendant's theory. 
Instruction No. 11 (R. 26) details factors testified 
to by the defendant's appraiser respecting the com-
parability of properties used in arriving at his market 
value opinion. This instruction substantially repeats the 
views of the defendant's appraiser, and amounts to an 
adoption of those views by the court. The jurors are 
supposed to determine the credibility and weight of 
the evidence; but the court assumed to tell the jurors 
what factors they should find to be most influential: 
"The more elements of comparison and simi-
larity that the sale has with the subject property, 
the more weight it is entitled in your determi-
nation of fair market value." 
This is not a proper instruction. It is patently a com-
ment by the court upon the credibility of the defendant's 
appraiser as compared with the appraiser called by 
plaintiff. The instruction is not only subject to the 
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same objections as Instruction No. 8, but as a whole, 
violates the well- established rule that it is error for 
the trial court to charge on the weight or sufficiency 
of the evidence. 88 C.J.S., Trial §285; Reid's Branson 
Instruction to Juries, Vol. 1, 1960 Repl. §27; Smith 
v. Cummings, 39 Utah 356, 117 Pac. 38; ( 1911) Olsen 
v. S. H. Kress & Co., 87 Utah 51, 48 P.2d 430 (1955). 
Instruction No. 12 ( R. 27) is similarily objection-
able, since it emphasizes the rental-capitalization theory 
of the determination of value as against the other 
theories testified to by the appraisers, i.e., market sales 
analysis, and reproduction cost. Again, it suggests to 
the jury that the evidence given by the defendant's 
appraiser respecting capitalization rates and rentals 
was entitled to more consideration in determination of 
the "after" value than was the reproduction cost evi-
dence given by the plaintiff's appraiser. In addition, 
the instruction improperly assumes facts (that buyers 
do investigate rental income of property in determining 
market value) not admitted. That this is improper 
is clearly stated in Reid's Branson Instructions to 
Juries, supra §27: 
"A trial judge must not incorporate into his 
charge assumptions or positive statements as to 
facts which are in dispute since this practice may 
impress his interpretation of the evidence upon 
the jury." 
Instruction No. 19 (R. 34) must have left the jury 
with the impression that the defendant was a knight 
in shining armor, who needed protection against a 
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grasping, unhuman Road Commission. Loaded words 
dominate the instruction. A mild preface respecting 
the State's right to take the property, is followed by 
the lament that a citizen has "no choice but to surrender 
and yield up its property," and that the citizen is to 
be paid "justly and fairly" for the property "expro-
priated from it." This instruction unfairly compares 
the positions of the citizen and the condemning au-
thority, and like previously mentioned instructions 
erroneously states the law respecting the measure of 
damages to the property not condemned. Moreover, 
the use of capital letters in "JUST COMPENSA-
TION," added to the other factors, tends toward a 
rather one-sided presentation to the jury. Instructions 
which are inflammatory or tend to excite passion, preju-
dice or sympathy are improper and "the giving of 
such an instruction will ordinarily result in a reversal". 
Reid's Branson Instructions to Juries, supra §110; 
88 C.J.S. Trial, §343. 
Instruction No. 20 ( R. 35) would reasonably be 
interpreted by the jury as a comment by the court that 
the appraiser called by the defendant was most believ-
able, partieularly in light of developments subsequent 
to the court's ruling that the appraiser called by the 
State, Mr. C. Francis Solomon, might remain in the 
courtroom notwithstanding the defendant's motion for 
exclusion of witnesses ( R. 168-172). 
In his cross examination of Mr. Solomon, the 
defendant's counsel emphasized the term "advocate" 
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and explored at length the reasons for .Mr. Solomon's 
continued presence in the courtroom following the 
court's ruling, and the possibility of some interest in 
the outcome (R. 747-752). In addition, during the 
course of the trial, counsel repeatedly made remarks 
in the presence of the jury concerning the fact that 
.Mr. Solomon had not been excluded and was remaining 
at the instance of the plaintiff (R. 173, 261, 283, 749). 
Instruction No. 20 cannot be read without con-
sideration of the court's ruling on the exclusionary 
motion, .Mr. Solomon's continued presence, the cross 
examination concerning "interest in the outcome of 
the case," and counsel's questions about advocacy. The 
effect of Instruction No. 20 in this context is to suggest 
to the jury that .Mr. Solomon, whose interest in the 
case was "demonstrated" by his remaining in the court-
room, was not nearly so entitled to belief as was Mr. 
Williams, the appraiser called by the defendant, because 
the latter did not remain in the courtroom and osten-
sibly had no interest in the outcome. The fact that the 
instruction covered some of the same ground as Instruc-
tion No. 25 makes the effect of the suggestion even 
stronger. 
Instruction No. 21 ( R. 36) is not particularly 
harmful as the case was tried, inasmuch as the plaintiff 
was prohibited from introducing evidence of the avail-
ability of comparable property. However, when the 
case is remanded the trial court should be advised that 
the jury need not return a verdict between the ranges 
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testified to by the experts. The jury is entitled to con-
sider the factors taken into account by each of the 
experts in arriving at his opinion as to the value of the 
property, and if it finds that some of these factors do 
not exist or have been overstated, it can adjust the 
expert's opinion accordingly. 
IV 
THE COURT ERRONEOUSLY EXCLUD-
ED EVIDENCE OFFERED BY PLAINTIFF. 
During the cross examination of C. Francis Solo-
mon, the appraiser called by plaintiff, defendant's 
counsel went into great detail on the methods followed 
by Mr. Solomon in preparing his appraisal report. 
During the examination he asked for and obtained a 
copy of the appraisal report ( R. 808-809) , and then 
proceeded to cross examine .Mr. Solomon in great detail 
about the computations and contents found in the 
report ( R. 809 et seq.) He suggested the report, made 
prior to trial, did not include any reference to the 
relocation of septic tanks (R. 827). He cross examined 
Mr. Solomon further with respect to the report and 
the method used in arriving at the conclusions con-
tained in the report (R. 831-838). 
On redirect examination Mr. Solomon identified 
Exhibit P-33 as his appraisal report prepared on Feb-
ruary 4, 1967 (R. 844). He said the report was pre-
pared and submitted prior to the date of the trial, and 
that it contained the various computations with respect 
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to which the defendant's counsel had cross examined 
him (R. 845). But on objection of defendant's counsel 
the court refused to admit the appraisal report in evi-
dence, contrary to an established rule of evidence that 
when a witness is cross examined with respect to the 
contents of a document the document itself may be 
introduced in evidence as part of the redirect exami-
nation of the witness. Nichols on Eminent Domain, 
Vol. 5, § 18-1(1), 98 C.J.S. 'Vitnesses, §427, Wooten 
v. State, 348 SW 2d 281 (Tex. Civ. Apps., 1961); Der-
rick v. Blazers, 355 Mich. 176, 93 N.W.2d 909 (1959). 
As suggested in a number of cases the rule is a corollary 
of that followed in State v. Cooper, 114 Utah 531, 201 
P .2d 764 ( 1949), that any evidence logically tending 
to rebut inferences raised on cross examination is ad-
missible. 
v 
THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR A NE'V TRIAL. 
On April 5, 1967, plaintiff moved for a new trial 
and pointed out to the court the error in its refusal of 
evidence relating to the availability of comparable 
property, its refusal to give the plaintiff's requested 
Instruction No. 15, and its giving of various other 
instructions (R. 95-96). On April 27, 1967, the motion 
for a new trial was denied ( R. 99) , and an appeal was 
thereupon taken to this court. 
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Plaintiff regards it as unnecessary to quote authori-
ties in support of this point, since it is apparent that 
if the court ruled improperly on the evidence and 
instruction with respect to comparable property, a 
material issue was never tried, and the only appropriate 
relief to be granted is reversal of the judgment and 
remand of the case for a new trial. 
CONCLUSION 
A determination of the amount of damages suffered 
by a land owner (because of severance and the con-
struction of the improvement) requires evidence not 
so much of the "after" market value of the property, 
as of the damages suffered. The damages may or may 
not be the same as the "before" less the "after" value. 
If there were no duty to mitigate damages, there would 
be little room for argument, but the cases recognize 
such a duty to mitigate, and this duty should be trans-
lated into a duty to obtain comparable property, if 
available, to replace that severed, or that damaged by 
construction of the improvement by the condemnor. 
The trial court's refusal of evidence of the avail-
ability of comparable property, and its refusal to in-
struct the jury on the effect of availability, prevented 
the jury from giving consideration to a substantial 
factor in the determination of compensation and dam-
ages, and completely ignored a rule of law clearly 
established by this court. Moreover, the court's rulings 
39 
on the evidence, its misdirection of the jury, and its 
comments on the testimony, precluded fair, objective 
consideration of the issues actually tried. 
The judgment should be reversed and a new trial 
ordered. 
Respectfully submitted, 
PHIL L. HANSEN 
Attorney General of Utah 
BRYCE E. ROE 
Special Assistant Attorney General 
510 American Oil Building 











APPENDIX - Figure 1 
STYL.-CRE.TE. CONST. INC. ETA.L.. 
14.265 ACRES • 
. 
~ • 
_________ •_C_A_I!. LINE.=:. 
_____ ._._ .. _T. r:uw LINE:;,.. 













APPENDIX - Figure 2 
PARCEL C 
STYL-CRETE CONST INC £TAI... 
<t_ .STl-f SOI/TH STREET'-
42 




Sr11 SO. STREET 
-.. 
43 
APPENDIX - Figure 3 
STYLE-CRETE 
CONST., INC. 
W. P. I?. I?. TRACK R£LOCATIO 
